Retributions  

Why Operation Nandigram?

The horrors of Nandigram have been well-documented. For six days, the state simply withered away while the goons of CPI-M ”captured” Nandigram: burning houses, looting and raping virtually at will. Justifying this outrage, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya has argued that the evicted villagers were ”being paid back in the same coin”.

It is quite clear that Nandigram was a well planned operation; the Left leaders–both at the state and the center–were in the loop. Why else would the state policy meekly stand by while the cadres ran amok? It is also hard to imagine that the cadres would plan such a major operation without sanction from the top. This begets the question: Why would the Left sanction an operation which would be clearly embarrassing at the national level? After all, the Communists go to extraordinary lengths to protect and project their moral superiority. The answer lies in the peculiar politics of Bengal.

The Communist dominance in Bengal is based on the bedrock of intimidation and reward. Frequently, they go hand in hand. Communists anyway have little respect for state except as an extension of the party. In Bengal, with the total domination of the party, only Communist sympathizers are appointed to influential positions who return the favor by looking after their own. In short, the party has built a system in which it is possible to directly reward its supporters and penalize those opposed to it.

Nowhere is this more effective than in rural Bengal–the real center of the party’s power and authority.  In the last 30 years, even as urban Bengal’s flirtation with communism has never quite developed into a mature relationship, rural Bengal has consistently and unequivocally voted for the Communists. Conventional wisdom has attributed the continued hold of communist parties to the Operation Barga. However, the story of communist conquest of rural Bengal began at least a decade before that.

In the first two decades after independence, the Congress had dominated Bengal politics by forging an alliance of the large landowners, middle class and by default dalits and Muslims. The role of the party in this alliance was that of a patron.  An alternative political formation looking for long-term success had to build an alliance of those dispossessed by the ruling clique.

In 1967, the Left-Front first came to power in Bengal in alliance with the mild-mannered Gandhian Ajoy Mukherjee. From the very beginning the Communists were active in the land movement, however, they were still largely powerless. The Mukherjee government was dismissed in1969 and in the following elections, Communists once again formed an alliance government with Mukherjee.  It was between 1969-1971 the Communists began to emerge as the truly effective force in rural Bengal politics. Many factors were responsible for this change.

First, it was the period in which the Naxal movement was at its peak. Rural Bengal was in flames and was far more receptive to revolutionary ideas than any period before or since then.

Second, the Communists chose their enemies cleverly.  Their peasant body, Krishak Sabha was essentially a body of rich and middle cleas peasants; it was never a movement of the Bagirdars. Instead of attacking all the landowners, the Communists targetted only the biggest one. This careful selection of targets not only guarnteed political support within the villages–so essential for a fledging organization–but dented the Congress support base. In the game of patronage, the Communists could protect and reward its supporters–the Congress couldn’t.

Third, Jyoti Base was the home minister during the second Mukherjee administration. He asked the police to stand by and not interfere in village level land disputes. This had two important effects. First, the entrenched class couldn’t rely on the state machinery which would normally be expected to align it self with the rich land-owners. Second, the non-involvement of the state meant that the re-distribution of the land became a popular movement led by the party. Agitation for its on sake has its special importance in Communist lexicon for it allows the party to capture popular imagination. This is exactly what happened in Bengal.

Thus, the Communists benefited from the conflict between large landowners and the middle peasants. The position of bagirdars virtually remained the same. Previously, they had offered lathi power to the zamindars, now they moved en masse to the new victors.

Having sewn together a powerful new constituency, and aided by the excesses of S.S. Ray administration, it was only a matter of time before the Communists captured the Writer’s building. Soon operation Barga was launched to ensure permanent tenancy rights to the bagirdars. The Communists were prudent enough never to effect mass transfer of land which could have alienated the landed peasants–its main support base. While the operation Barga definitely revitalized the rural economy of Bengal, it is questionable whether it really benefited the bagirdars.

Its powerful alliance with the middle-class peasants forged between 1969-1971 has allowed the Communists to maintain their grip on rural Bengal. It is in this light the Nandigram operation must be understood.  With its years in power, the Communists in Bengal have lost their revolutionary fervor and have become the protectors of the status quo. They have also acquired in a huge stake in village politics–indeed, it is this support machinery which efficiently delivers elections after elections. The conflict in Nandigram was essentially a struggle between the peasants aligned with the communists and those opposed to it. In its thirty years rule, the Communists had always managed to ensure that their supporters victory in any conflict. The entire relationship was built on this reciprocity. In Nandigram on the other hand, it was the Communist supporters who were force to leave. Allowing this situation to continue would have led to disillusionment within the rank and file of the party; the carefully constructed edifice of patronage would have crumbled. The party had to move, and so it did. Since the quote-a-minute leaders like Prakash Karat and A.B.Bardhan are relevant only because of the Lok Sabha MP’s from Bengal, they had little choice but to watch silently while the party machinery steamrolled the opposition.

(to be continued)