Retributions  

Pray, where do the figures come from?

Leave aside the wooly-headed conclusions for a minute or the nonsense about India owing something to Pakistan. What is particularly remarkable about Rajmohan Gandhi’s op-ed in The Hindustan Times is the amazing confidence with which he marshals figures bereft of any actual empirical work,

But the violent extremists who blast women, children and the elderly into body pieces that land in mosques and bazaars have firmly displaced the US from its position as the entity Pakistanis most detest.

This national sentiment — plain to anyone observing the Pakistani scene — is shared across political, sectarian and provincial divides, across the civilian/military divide, and by rich and poor alike. No stance adopted by the US or India attracts the level of popular revulsion that Pakistan’s violent jihadists have invited on their heads.

Survival is the driving force behind this firm reappraisal. Pakistanis obliged to thank God at the end of every non-tragic day throw an expectant glance at India. No doubt, there are Pakistanis who hate India and who would bleed India if they could, as some of their compatriots have done. But these add up to a miniscule minority. The vast majority in Pakistan hopes that Indians will understand their situation, help if they can, and refrain from hurting if they cannot help.

As is true of all peoples, Pakistanis differ one from the other. In respect of other peoples or communities, Sri Lanka’s Tamils for instance, Indians have no difficulty in separating the bulk of the Tamil population from the Tamil Tigers who perpetrated cruel deeds.

Thanks to bitter history, we find it much harder to do this with Pakistanis. At least 19 out of 20 Pakistanis hate the violent jihadists, but this fact is lost on us. [link}(emphasis added)

How exactly, for instance, Rajmohan Gandhi knows that “at least 19 out of 20″ Pakistanis hate the violent Jihadists and not 18 or Lord be praised, 20 out of 20? This is not a rhetorical question: It is infuriating that serious scholars–Gandhi is the author of multiple books and is currently a research professor of History at the University of Illinois– would so casually drop figures merely to strengthen their pre-decided conclusions. Indeed, Gandhi could have made the same arguments without such utter disdain for empirical work but perhaps to the casual reader that would not have carried the same conviction. What is particularly galling is that Mr Gandhi concludes there is no difference across the spectrum with even the military turning against the militants. Forget all the talk about strategic depth or reluctance to act against the  Haqqani network in Afghanistan despite strong warnings from President Obama.

Now, actual empirical work does suggest that there is growing concern among common Pakistanis about the extremism ravaging their country. But to argue that the military jihadi complex–the real power center in that country–has been dismantled and the entire nation of Pakistan marches as one against the militants abandoning a policy which that state has pursued for pretty much its entire existence is just wishful thinking. Worst of course is the demand that Indian policies should be guided by such errant and muddled thinking.

Maybe yes but…

Wise heads tell us that the next BJP leader must be elected and not nominated. While the mechanism is not clear, it would necessarily involve  party workers and sympathizers voting in a closed primary.

Prima facie, it is hard to argue against this approach. Rather than imposing a leader by the unelected–and unelectable!– apparatchiks  of Nagpur, it would undoubtedly be more useful and democratic if the party leader is the choice of grass root supporters. The lack of inner party democracy in Indian politics and the culture of High Command quite rightly exasperates most Indians.

Nevertheless, from an electoral view point, it is unlikely that a BJP leader elected by primaries would be viable. For a party to win elections in India, it necessarily has to embrace a Big Tent. It is simply impossible for a party which upholds an exclusivist agenda to thrive in the long term—particularly in case of national politics.

As BJP loses influence in national politics, it’s core base of supporters has winnowed down to those who are attracted mainly by Hindutva: Contrary to what it’s supporters may claim, Hindutva is generally perceived to a be religious centered ideology which excludes important minority groups—most noticeably Muslims. As the reception of the likes of Varun Gandhi showed, the base is more attracted by sword wielding Hindu Warriors than serious policy oriented candidates. Left to them, it is not inconceivable that they would elect a leader who would be wildly attractive to the core group of supporters but would put off everyone else—virtually guaranteeing political wilderness.

Critics may point out that repeated political defeats would convince even the most ideologically inclined to support more moderate and electable candidates. Perhaps, but it is unlikely. Those who are fascinated by ideological rigidity consider it a manner of honor to lose elections. In any case, the search for the niravana of ideological purity is an endless journey in which every electoral defeat is explained as a consequence of making compromises and heroes are discarded as heretics at the slightest transgression. As BJP becomes more marginalized, the core supporters would see even less need for accommodation. It is indeed a vicious cycle.

BJP’s problems are much more fundamental than lack of true inner party democracy. It needs to reinvent it self as a modern political party  and stop harking back to its glory days for inspiration. What may be the solution is not quite clear except the fond hope that threat of permanent marginalization may force at least the sane ones to chart a fresh path.

Till that happens, India is looking at single party rule—primaries or no primaries.

What’s the hurry?

In an op-ed in the Daily Pioneer, Ramavtar Yadav and Sushant K. Singh argue that government should reject the idea of talks with Maoists

It is worth remembering that on both the occasions when talks were held, the Maoists were losing ground and were on the run. The talks provided a breather to them; they regrouped and emerged stronger thereafter. Talks are thus nothing but tactical pauses for the Maoists in their long-drawn battle to seize political power by military force. They, and their overground workers, will accept or make an offer for talks only when they are down. It is a ploy to buy time, to rebuild their strength, to garner fresh publicity, and to recalibrate their strategy.

Having cleverly employed the ruse of talks earlier, the Maoists have again offered to talk to distract the Government from going ahead with ‘Operation Green Hunt’. In this strategy, they will be actively aided by their overground workers, the so called liberal intellectuals. There will be concerted emotional appeals to the Government: Why not talk? Why shed blood?

If the Government succumbs to this pressure, the Maoists — as witnessed earlier — will have protracted dramatised facade of talks and utilise the time and opportunity to recruit and strengthen their cadres. The talks will invariably fail as their objective is to seize political power by overthrowing the state and nothing short of their stated goal will be acceptable to them. [link]

There will be a time for talk but first the military might of the Maoists must be tackled. As the example of LTTE so clearly showed, militant organizations develop a vested interest in violence. Talking to them serves little purpose except legitimizing the movement and offering them time to further develop their military strength.

Let’s stop being apologetic about wealth

In my article in the October issue of Pragati, I argue that UPA government’s so-called austerity drive achieves little except legitimizing poverty,

The fundamental problem with the austerity drive and its glorification in certain quarters is that like  Mr Bachchan’s movies from the 1970’s, it legitimises poverty. The clarion calls for return to days of Gandhian socialism might be mere sloganeering but it still represents the idea that poverty is an elevated state of consciousness attaching to it an ill-deserved moralistic value. Now that large swathes of India are enveloped in the darkness of poverty is undeniable. Whether couched in terms of “inclusive growth” or “growth with human face”, Indian growth story needs to embrace hundreds of millions who continue to live in poverty.

Download the October issue for much more including extensive coverage of India’s ”gravest internal security threat”: Maoism.

P.S The Pragati article also appears as an op-ed in the Mail Today.

The complicated legacy of YSR

The tragic death of the Andhra Pradesh chief minister has achieved what had seemed impossible only a few days earlier: displacing BJP from news headlines. In an era of 24/7 news channels, it was almost inevitable that a search for a missing copter which went on for over 24 hours would dominate the news cycle. While the media covers YSR’s career and death from every angle conceivable, two larger points need to be made,

First, YSR’s rise to political prominence  (a heavyweight regional satrap in the Congress party is a breed which is almost extinct), represents the culmination of a process in which strongmen and warlords  are no longer content to serve as the lackeys of the regular politicians–providing muscle power in return for preservation of economic interests and safety from legal consequences. Instead, they wish to capture the political power for they realize the rewards are much higher when they are their own bosses. While YSR’s dynamism and popularity is undeniable, what deserves to be mentioned in equal detail is the sordid side of his rise: Not just the violence and murders which were his preferred companions in his younger years but the ability to leverage state’s economic apparatus for personal aggrandizement. Much like the Reddy brothers of Bellary who virtually bankroll the BJP in the state, and in the process, have benefited enormously from capturing mining interests, YSR exploited his political rise to become perhaps the most prominent of that breed which is a recent phenomenon in Indian politics: businessman-politician. Inevitably, this crony capitalism is most effective in sectors where the state retains monopoly powers: land, mining, and  infrastructural projects. Indeed, a more sophisticated example of the same phenomenon is the battle between the Ambani brothers currently underway in the corridors of power in New Delhi.

Now, of course, these leaders have won elections. They are almost invariably populists who rather than building sustainable institutions, have bought popularity by handouts: free power, rice at 2rs per kg and lately even insurance schemes for the poor. While a large section of the poor benefit to some extent from these populist schemes and they, in turn, vote their benefactors back to power, not only the financial viability of these myriad schemes but even the their long term positive effects are doubtful. More importantly, electoral success provides cover for the corruption and the loot.

And that brings us to the second point: While elections are an important part of democracy, and leaders who cannot win elections are unlikely to influence public policy, they cannot be the end all of the democratic process. Lately, the media, or specifically the electronic media, has a adopted a template in which success in elections seems to wash away all the sins of a leader. (Except for one, of course.) Perhaps, it is the need of television punditry which rests on certitude–when was the last time a television pundit confessed that he did not know an answer?–or the requirement for instant heroes and villains, but measuring leadership and achievement merely by elections is fraught with danger. For it reduces the entire democratic process to a five year ritual. Yes, in a democracy, elections are the calculus for judging popular support, but should a political entire career be reduced to merely that? The effusive eulogies which have followed YSR’s departure seems to have entirely missed this point.

Recently, the Financial Times had warned the danger oligarchs present to the Indian democracy. While the FT’s view may be too alarmist, the rise of the the likes of YSR signals that it is a danger which Indian democracy must guard against.

Let’s not confuse a power grab with ideological battles

Reading prominent political commentators it would appear that the current factional fights in BJP are about ideology: On one side are the ”moderates” led by the likes of Jaswant Singh and Yashwant Sinha opposed by the Hinduvata lobby led by the party president, Rajnath Singh. The more liberal commentators despair that the party is losing the ideological battle and is unable to transform into a genuine Right-of-center party. (As if there is a version of the party they would find agreeable.)

The argument of the commentariat are certainly strengthened by the bellicose statements issued by Rajnath Singh who promises that the party would never deviate from the path of Hinduvata (And adds in the next line that the party must win the support of the poor, agriculturists, and the middle class; what may be the connection, if one may ask?)

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A requiem for BJP

The most hopeful take on the sordid Jaswant Singh affair is that he was really expelled due to internal politics of the BJP: The Advani clique is simply unprepared to accept accountability for the party’s stunning electoral defeat and BJP will act against anyone who demands even a degree of accountability. By expelling Jaswant Singh in this manner—the party president informed him on the phone—the party’s ruling clique is sending out a clear message that anyone challenging its authority would no longer find any place in the party. In short, forget 2009, Advani is preparing to battle for the position of leader of opposition after the 2014 elections.

Because if he was really expelled for writing a book—a book!—then this Talibani party should really self-destruct. A party led by an intellectual pygmy who probably has never read a book after primary school; shepherded by apparatchiks in RSS who have made not one—not one!—contribution to understanding of Indian history and culture; and commanded by a hypocrite who explained in multiple media interviews how his comments were misunderstood on Jinnah should really dissolve it self. And spare India the spectacle of its principal opposition party go bust.

Because if he was really expelled for writing a book—a book!—then clearly this party has no use for intellectual discussion; for thought; and for openness. Much like the Congress party whose principal purpose now is advancement of the dynasty, BJP has its own set of holy cows, who can never be questioned—not even in the slightest—because it will go against the party’s core ideology. What sort of ideology is defined by individuals?

With its current leadership, there is no hope for BJP—none whatsoever! Unfortunately, BJP will not disappear. It will stick around as a skeleton of its glory days, confined to 50-60 seats in the Lok Sabha, left with  a core loony fringe and Internet warriors, and its leaders will continue to provide entertainment for the nation.

All we can do is wait for the next episode of this never-ending saga.

Let’s stop whitewashing our history

Jaswant Singh’s new biography of Muhammad Ali Jinnah has quite predictably raised political hackles. The Congress which has long forgotten the distinction between the Nehru-Gandhi family and India has raised questions about Mr Singh’s nationalism. BJP, a party which has never shown much fondness for intellectual pursuits, has disassociated it self ”completely” from Jaswant Singh’s book with some leaders even demanding ”action” against the author.

But what is particularly disappointing is the response from the media. Barring some honorable exceptions–Karan Thapar’s interview with Jaswant Singh was particularly well done–the majority seems to view the book from the prism of current Indian politics. Or worse, question why BJP leaders are obsessed with Jinnah. Sample this comment from CNN-IBN’s National affairs’ editor,

This BJP craze for Jinnah is ridiculous. Why deify a partitionist when Maulana Azad harboured little ambition and worked for a united India?[link]

For one, Jaswant Singh has clearly stated that he has written his book as an Indian concerned about one of the most important events in modern Indian history (Not to mention that BJP is most embarrassed about Jinnah). For another, true history can never only be about the ”good guy”–it must involve those who shape history whether we like their politics or not. In that respect, Jinnah was definitely one of the most important and influential figures of Indian history.

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The home minister gets it right

Addressing the Chief Minister’s Conference on internal security, home minister, P Chidambaram makes an important point,

We believe in the two-pronged approach of development and police action. However, the naxalites are anti-development and have targeted the very instruments of development – school buildings, roads, telephone towers etc. They know that development will wean the masses, especially the poor tribals, away from the grip of the naxalites. Hence, these deliberate attacks on developmental activities. Our response therefore will be police action to wrest control of territory that is now dominated by the naxalities, restoration of civil administration and undertaking developmental activities – in that order[link]

The order is exactly right. As we have argued in our Indian Express op-ed, security operations must happen first, and then only development can happen. Hopefully, Mr Chidambaram’s message will be heard by the chief ministers and the larger establishment and the temptation of pouring thousands of crores without first ensuring rule of law will be eschewed.

Too much money!

Retributions has previously argued that focusing on development or reward for surrender schemes in Maoist affected areas will be ineffective  in absence of security as it is simply too lucrative to be a Maoist these days. How lucrative? The Times of India estimates that the extortion and drug smuggling earns the Maoists close to 1500 crores a year,

If a conservative estimate is taken of the income generated from ‘levy’ in the seven most Naxal-infested states — Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal and Maharashtra — security agencies feel the collection from these areas, which are commonly referred to as ‘red corridor’, amount to nearly Rs 1,500 crore.

The Naxals have even come out with a card, recovered by forces, which clearly shows the exact amount of ‘levy’ to be paid by contractors, petrol pump owners and land owners.

It usually ranges from 10% of the project cost for those making unpaved roads to five per cent for small bridges and others.

Besides the fixed levy, the left-wing extremists groups also demand money from industries functioning in the areas “as and when they need” and even issue receipts for the same [link]

Without ending this easy source of funds, merely pouring in thousands of crores will only help the Maoists further enrich themselves. The government should focus on well thought out security operations against the Maoists while ensuring minimum inconvenience to local populace, and then focus on development.