Retributions  

An examination of civil-military relationship

Writing in The Daily Pioneer, Sushant K. Singh offers his perspective on the recent reports on civil-military conflict,

It has been asserted by most military veterans — who can be safely assumed as surrogates for serving officers — that that this premise has resulted in bureaucrats protecting their turf in a perverse interpretation of civil control. While the military prefers political control exercised by elected politicians, the intervening bureaucratic layer between the brass and the political leadership results in ‘bureaucratic control’. But in the recent case of the Defence Minister forcing the Army chief’s hand against his own wishes, the ire of the military has been directed against the political leadership as well. Some commentators have even gone on to suggest that the Army chief should have resigned rather than accept the ministerial advice. They forget that walking away from the civil-military relationship through resignation is a dangerous instrument that, if used, will destroy all civilian trust in the military leadership.

The line between what constitutes ‘political control’ and ‘political interference’ in military affairs is rather blurred. Most military officers desire that the civilian leadership delegate to the military autonomous control over all things military. But military control in practice — as articulated by Feaver — allows for direct civilian supervision of military matters, down to whatever level the civilian authorities find necessary. [link]

The idea that bureaucrats can be excised from the political military relationship is a non-starter and is merely a fig leaf to suggest no political oversight of military institution—an anathema in a constitutional democracy.